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Abstract
This article is an attempt to contribute a view on the economic crisis from classical sociology, 
a voice often missing from the sociological response to the crisis. The work of Émile Durkheim 
provides a unique perspective here centred on morality and inequality produced in a historical 
context akin to our neoliberal times. It is argued there are four key points to take from Durkheim’s 
work. First, that the initial credit crunch can be more fully understood with reference to the 
economic anomie which Durkheim sees as ‘chronic’ in a time of marketisation. Second, that this 
creates an antagonistic relationship between a supposedly self-dependent rich and lazy poor. 
Third, this conception of self-dependency and individual initiative makes any attempt to regulate 
the economy akin to sacrilege. Finally, the state is unwilling to intervene due to the emergence 
of ‘pseudo-democracies’. Therefore, Durkheim’s theory accounts for the initial crisis, austerity 
and double-dip recessions in a sociological framework. The article concludes by returning to 
the centrality of morality to the crisis for Durkheim and highlighting the omission of this in 
contemporary debates.
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In April 2012, The Guardian columnist Aditya Chakrabortty published an article bemoaning 
the lack of sociological responses to the economic crisis. He claimed that it appears there 
is little ‘encouragement to engage’ with finance, markets and crisis for sociologists and 
that, given their track record, it was ‘hard to believe they really want to’ (Chakrabortty, 
2012b). The response from the sociology community was, inevitably, vociferous. Letters 
were published in The Guardian on the behalf of the British Sociological Association 
Corresponding author:
Matt Dawson, University of Glasgow, Adam Smith Building, 40 Bute Gardens, Glasgow G12 8RT, UK.
Email: matt.dawson@glasgow.ac.uk
572277 JCS0010.1177/1468795X15572277Journal of Classical SociologyDawson
research-article2015
Article
 at Glasgow University Library on November 27, 2015jcs.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
322 Journal of Classical Sociology 15(4) 
(BSA) (The Guardian, 2012) and Chakrabortty’s inbox filled up with messages from 
those looking to defend the discipline. Chakrabortty responded 3 weeks later, claiming 
he was not convinced and that, privately at least, many academics agreed with him 
(Chakrabortty, 2012a). For him, the response of the BSA was too specialised meaning 
that ‘the trade body for British sociologists proudly displayed its engagement by enumer-
ating articles in the Journal of Niche Studies’ (Chakrabortty, 2012a). More responses 
followed, including a further Guardian article by then BSA President John Brewer 
(2012) and the publication of an 11-page formal response by the BSA outlining relevant 
sociological research on finance, markets and the crisis (BSA, n.d.).
Within this debate, something was very pronounced – the search for ‘newness’. 
Chakrabortty (2012b) himself was asking for ‘fresh voices’ and sociology responded in 
kind. I would argue this overlooked the fact that classical sociology was just as useful in 
attempting to understand the nature of the crisis and to challenge the dominant economic 
and political voices. Indeed, the work of Émile Durkheim is just such a resource, and this 
article is an attempt to inject a particularly Durkheimian voice into debates on the 
economic crisis.
To do so, I will be taking a broad view of the economic crisis. This is not just the 
initial ‘credit crunch’ and ensuing recession, but also includes the ‘age of austerity’ and 
the continued presence of crisis in the form of double-dip, and near-triple-dip, recession. 
In what follows, I will discuss these elements separately before drawing them together. 
In doing so, this article builds upon studies which seek to utilise Durkheim for times of 
economic crisis (Filloux, 1993; Lukes, 2009; Mestrovic, 1991; Stedman Jones, 2001: 
103). Yet, when it comes to the political response of austerity and double-dip recessions, 
I hope to suggest a new appreciation of Durkheim’s (1959) economic and political soci-
ology that can be used to more fully understand ‘our collective malaise’ (p. 7). Therefore, 
Durkheim’s work provides a sociological perspective on multiple aspects of the crisis, 
not solely its initial causes or its results but both.
My argument in what follows is twofold. The first is that Durkheim provides useful 
tools for understanding not only the nature of the economic crisis but also the connection 
between its various elements. Looking at events with the use of concepts such as eco-
nomic anomie provides a sociological explanation for how the events of the credit crunch 
and the age of austerity emerge from a common cause: neoliberal marketisation. The 
second claim is to demonstrate the contemporary relevance of Durkheim’s economic and 
political sociology to an era of neoliberalism. Recently, attention has turned to Durkheim’s 
role in the ‘birth’ of economic sociology (Steiner, 2011), and this article is meant as a 
contribution to such a reassessment. In what follows, I will be drawing from across the 
breadth of Durkheim’s economic and political writings although I will make extensive 
use of his argument concerning economic anomie in Suicide (Durkheim, 1952).
Durkheim and the credit crunch
When advising sociologists who wish to understand the nature of political economy, 
including their pathological or normal form, Durkheim (1982) advocates they ‘investi-
gate what in the past gave rise’ to such conditions and ‘whether these conditions still 
pertain in the present or, on the contrary, have changed’ (p. 95). I will follow this advice 
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throughout the article to argue that the credit crunch and resulting age of austerity can be 
more fully understood with reference to a pathological social fact: economic anomie.
The credit crunch – here I refer specifically to the dwindling availability of credit for 
exchange between banks following a number of defaults on ‘sub-prime’ mortgages – 
occurred after a long period of economic growth. In the 10 years leading up to 2008, the 
British economy had grown at an average rate of 3.2 per cent (World Bank, 2014). Long-
time Chancellor Gordon Brown had said goodbye to ‘boom and bust’; the boom would 
remain, but the bust was part of the past. This continual growth helped give birth to a 
period of consumerism. As Bauman (2007b) put it, we entered the stage of a ‘society of 
consumers’ which sees individuals ‘primarily in their capacity of consumers … the kind 
of society that promotes, encourages or enforces the choice of a consumerist lifestyle and 
life strategy and dislikes all alternative cultural options’ (pp. 52–53). This conception of 
the ideal consumer pervaded political discourse. European governments followed 
Margaret Thatcher in the advocacy of (consumer) choice above all else (Bauman, 2007a).
Therefore, the period leading up to the credit crunch was categorised by two factors: 
continual growth and the expansion of consumerism. These form the basis for Durkheim’s 
(1952) description of economic anomie (pp. 201–219). To recap this argument, Durkheim 
(1952) claims humans are defined by insatiable appetites which are ‘unlimited [in] so far 
as they depend on the individual alone’ (p. 208). Unlike animals, there are no organic or 
psychological limits to our desires, our wants are an ‘an insatiable and bottomless abyss’ 
(Durkheim, 1952: 208). This is why forms of regulation, inevitably moral in nature, have 
emerged in order to limit and control such desires. The appropriate limits emerge from 
corresponding ideas of the value of occupations: ‘the respective value of different social 
services’ and ‘the relative reward due to each’ (Durkheim, 1952: 210), thereby regulating 
and limiting desire according to the appropriate social value of our differing occupa-
tional activity. Importantly, such forms of regulation must be considered just ‘by the 
peoples subject to it’ (Durkheim, 1952: 212). Consequently, moral regulation emerges 
from ‘public opinion’ or ‘public feeling’ which would be ‘scandalised’ if the rich spent 
too frivolously or the lowest end of the scale were driven into a state of poverty 
(Durkheim, 1952: 210). While greater equality, by further equalising the resources given 
to all, would lessen the need for such restraints, it will not remove them because this is 
always a ‘matter of degree’ (Durkheim, 1952: 212). Therefore, for Durkheim, a normal 
economy is categorised by moral limits on desire considered just for that society. Thus, 
there is an equilibrium between resources received and conceptions of justice, based 
upon the social value of different occupations.
Such equilibrium is upset in a period of economic boom. The new opportunities 
offered by the promise of exciting and well-paid new jobs1 and the presence of enticing, 
suddenly more affordable, consumer products upset this by challenging the established 
link between social position and social reward. The swiftness of such changes in a time 
of economic boom means that
As the conditions of life are changed, the standard according to which needs were regulated can 
no longer remain the same; for it varies with social resources, since it largely determines the share 
for each class of producers. The scale is upset; but a new scale cannot be immediately improvised.
(Durkheim, 1952: 213)
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There emerges what Fromm (1942) termed a ‘lag’ between economic conditions and 
new ideas of a just distribution (pp. 244–245). As a result, the previously regulated 
desires are removed from moral regulation and ‘limits are unknown between the possible 
and the impossible, what is just and what is unjust, legitimate claims and hopes and those 
which are immoderate’ (Durkheim, 1952: 213). This freeing of consumer demands also 
occurs within an unequal distribution of wealth, meaning that while the poor feel an even 
more acute disconnect between what they receive and conceptions of a just distribution, 
the rich begin to seek out even more riches as ‘the more one has, the more one wants, 
since satisfactions received only stimulate instead of filling needs’ (Durkheim, 1952: 
209). This inevitably for Durkheim creates a state of mutual suspicion and jealously 
between the economically strong and the economically weak. The former can realise 
their consumerist dreams, while the latter become ‘faulty consumers’ defined by their 
inability to participate in the consumer market (Bauman, 2007b). Consequently, inequality 
of rewards expands. Here, we have the condition of economic anomie – the rewards of 
the economy and the ideas of justice which regulate it have dissolved in the cauldron of 
continuous growth and a thirst for the ‘novelties, unfamiliar pleasures, nameless sensa-
tions’ which make up the consumer market (Durkheim, 1952: 217).
This is Durkheim’s initial contribution to understanding the credit crunch: the period 
of economic boom preceding it was also a period of economic anomie. It would be too 
simplistic, not to mention profoundly un-Durkheimian, to say economic anomie ‘caused’ 
the recession, since, as we shall see, this is traced by Durkheim to the increase in marketi-
sation. Nevertheless, as we shall see, applying the concept of economic anomie allows us 
to more fully elucidate and understand the nature of the credit crunch and the events 
which made it up. For example, not only do we see the expansion of consumer desires, but 
we see this occurring in an unjust system, one marked by economic inequality. Indeed, 
inequality in the United Kingdom during this boom period was ‘unparalleled both histori-
cally and compared with the changes taking place at the same time in most other developed 
countries’ (Brewer et al., 2009: 2). Only tax credits and stealth taxes were present to act as 
the ‘peace treaties’ used to maintain some harmony between the rich and poor (Durkheim, 
1992: 11). This unequal expansion of credit and consumer goods was made worse by the 
nature of capitalist production in a globalised economy since
As the organised type of society develops, the fusion of the various segments entails the fusion 
of the markets into one single market, which embraces almost all of society. It even extends 
beyond and tends to become universal … The result is that each industry produces for consumers 
who are dispersed over the length and breadth of the country, or even the whole world … The 
producer can no longer keep the whole market within his purview, not even mentally. He [sic] 
can no longer figure out to himself its limits, since it is, so to speak, unlimited. Consequently 
production lacks any check or regulation. It can only proceed at random, and in the course of 
so doing it is inevitable that the yardstick is wrong, either in one way or the other. Hence the 
crises that periodically disturb economic functions.
(Durkheim, 1984: 305)
Here, we have what Engels (1984) termed the ‘anarchy of production’ (p. 138) 
whereby capitalism has a tendency towards overproduction and, therefore, a further ten-
dency towards crisis. In the credit crunch, this was true when it came to the production 
 at Glasgow University Library on November 27, 2015jcs.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Dawson 325
of credit where any reference to need and suitability was removed. Whether sub-prime 
mortgages or lines of credit were affordable and sustainable was less relevant than the 
immediate monetary return, either to the company or to the individual via bonuses. This 
is part of the nature of economic anomie, whereby economic action is determined solely 
by the profit motive, rather than moral considerations.
This, we may argue, was especially notable in the banking industry, from which 
the initial crisis sprung. As Durkheim (1992) notes, forms of moral regulation must be 
‘professional ethics’: moral codes which are occupation specific. As the consumer market 
advances, so does the division of labour, meaning that the moral regulation of the profes-
sions does not maintain pace with their specialisation. Indeed, following the credit crunch, 
it was often claimed the sheer complexity and opaque nature of such financial transactions 
made regulation problematic for anyone without a high level of financial knowledge 
(Bone, 2009). It was difficult to regulate that which only a few, in this case those running 
the system, understood. Thus, in place of these moral guidelines, the ‘amoral character of 
economic life’, the profit imperative, becomes the guiding light which
amounts to a public danger … the unleashing of economic interests has been accompanied by 
a debasing of public morality. We find that the manufacturer, the merchant, the workman, the 
employee, in carrying out his occupation, is aware of no influence set above him to check his 
egotism; he is subject to no moral discipline whatever and so he scouts any discipline at all of 
this kind.
(Durkheim, 1992: 12)
The banker, the mortgage lender and the financier are simply the most recent example 
of a long-term process of debasing professional ethics in favour of the profit imperative. 
When combined with continual growth and the expansion of the consumer market, eco-
nomic anomie is the inevitable outcome.
This section has highlighted a Durkheimian explanation for the nature and form of the 
credit crunch as resting in, to use Durkheim’s (1952) terminology, the ‘chronic’ nature of 
economic anomie during a period of marketisation (p. 215). The crisis this induced was 
shaped by the results of economic anomie including the freeing of desires from moral 
regulation, the lessening influence of professional ethics in the financial sector, the 
increase in economic inequality and the ‘anarchy of production’. Central to this argu-
ment is that Durkheim links this directly to increased marketisation. Economic anomie is 
only a plausible outcome under conditions where we see ‘the almost infinite extension of 
the market’ (Durkheim, 1952: 216). Therefore, it is essential to turn further to marketisa-
tion, and the neoliberal system which perpetuated this, to understand the impacts 
of economic anomie. Such marketisation was, and remains, a key characteristic of the 
dominant conception of neoliberal economics. Such an ideology has been especially 
dominant in the Anglo-American world, as well as South America, Eastern Europe and 
Sweden (cf. Harvey, 2005). While it is true that the material changes bought about as a 
result of this ideology can be exaggerated (Doogan, 2009), especially in Continental 
Europe (Sewell, 2009), what is significant for our discussion is how the ideological 
dominance of neoliberalism limits alternatives during the crisis. This is true both within 
the countries mentioned above and elsewhere, such as the introduction of neoliberal 
technocratic governance in Italy and Greece, as I will discuss below.
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One Durkheimian cure for economic anomie is a retraction and retreat of the market. 
The failure of this to occur – neoliberalism’s strange ‘non-death’ (Crouch, 2011) – is 
central to a Durkheimian understanding of the political response to the credit crunch: the 
age of austerity.
Durkheim on the age of austerity
Crisis is a pervasive term; however, it remains somewhat poorly defined so that it is 
‘de-valued in its analytical specificity’ (Holton, 1987: 503). When used in relation to our 
current situation does crisis refer to the initial credit crunch? Or to the events which 
followed? For Durkheim (1952), a ‘crisis’ is categorised by ‘disturbances of the collective 
order’ (p. 206), and, following this definition, I would suggest that the period from the 
initial credit crunch up to the present day is a ‘crisis’. My argument here is similar to 
Bauman’s (2012) that we are currently living through a time of ‘interregnum’ where the 
old order (neoliberalism) is, for Bauman, dying or, perhaps more accurately, has been 
shown to be faulty, without yet being replaced by a new economic order. This crisis has 
been exacerbated by the attempt to respond to it utilising the same mechanisms which 
created it. To elaborate a Durkheimian perspective on this, I will discuss three key elements 
of the crisis. One, the aforementioned economic inequality becomes an antagonistic rela-
tionship between a supposedly self-dependent rich and welfare-dependent poor. Two, this 
means any attempt to regulate the economy is resisted, creating the conditions for double- 
and near-triple-dip recessions. And finally, the crisis challenges the connection between 
state and political society creating, in the extreme case, a pseudo-democracy.
To begin, let us return to economic inequality. As highlighted above, periods of eco-
nomic anomie are also times of increased economic inequality. The new rewards and 
opportunities of periods of economic boom go increasingly to the already wealthy. This 
is made worse by the nature of contractual relationships. Under conditions of organic 
solidarity, Durkheim (1992) argues that we expect contracts to be ‘just’, meaning not 
only freely entered into but also where goods and services are exchanged at a fair, or just, 
value (p. 211). For this to occur, there must be some measure of equality between the 
contracting parties. However, in a condition of notable economic inequality, this becomes 
increasingly difficult. When two contracting partners encounter each other,
one contracts to obtain something to live on, and the other only to obtain something to live 
better on, it is clear that the force of resistance of the latter will far exceed that of the former, by 
the fact that he can drop the idea of contracting if he fails to get the terms he wants. The other 
cannot do this. He is therefore obliged to yield and to submit to what is laid down for him.
(Durkheim, 1992: 213)
When the profit motive determines economic activity at the expense of moral ends, 
such as in a period of economic anomie, contracts increasingly conform to this unjust 
model (Durkheim, 1992: 214). Needless to say, this exacerbates inequality, and since the 
poorer in the contracting relationship is aware of this unjust situation, the conflict and 
mutual antagonism between the classes expand. There is no opportunity to ‘bring peace 
to men’s minds’ and thus we encounter ‘ever-recurring conflicts … between the different 
factions of the economic structure’ (Durkheim, 1992: 11).
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For Durkheim, the super-ordinate finds justification for their self-interest and unjust 
contracts in the dominant conception of economic action, namely, the idealisation of 
individualised success. This is due to the nature of wealth since this, ‘by the power it 
bestows, deceives us into believing that we depend on ourselves only’ (Durkheim, 1952: 
214). This belief that wealth is solely due to individual success and effort leaves the 
wealthy feeling justified in their belief that being without wealth must therefore be an 
indication of a lack of effort on behalf of the poor. They should not be rewarded with just 
contracts or other benefits but must rather be ‘reduced to a state of subjection’ (Durkheim, 
1992: 11). Therefore, Durkheim (1992) argues that the inequality within capitalism 
becomes especially marked, and justified, when moral regulation is lacking and instead 
the amoral character of economic life expressed via marketisation becomes dominant 
(p. 12). In such a situation, due to the wealthy believing their success is solely due to 
individual effort, rather than socially produced conditions, further justification can be 
found for increasing inequality. Unjust contracts and expanding inequality are not seen 
as problems to be solved, but rather indications of the strengths of the system in rewarding 
individual talent and effort.
This idealisation of the unequal division of wealth is a key justification for the welfare 
cuts which form a central part of the age of austerity. A discourse of ‘strivers versus 
shirkers’, with the latter being those too lazy to work and being funded through the hard 
labour of the strivers, draws upon this conception of wealth being due to individual, 
rather than social, efforts. Therefore, cutting welfare for the poorest is not only permis-
sible but is also seen as fair and just (Levitas, 2012). In a significant shift, this concept 
of ‘fairness’ is now seen as fairness to the taxpayer, to the economically strong (Atkinson 
et al., 2012). For Durkheim, it would be unsurprising that the crisis has seen an expansion 
in inequality, with the richest 1 per cent of British society increasing their share of wealth 
to 10 per cent, while the bottom half take home 18 per cent of the wealth (Resolution 
Foundation, 2013). This is rather an inevitable outcome of the anomic conditions of 
extreme inequality.
We can also see this anomic conception of wealth manifested in one of the key 
elements of the ‘universal’ market: tax avoidance. When individual effort is seen to be all 
that creates wealth, those with wealth feel increasingly justified in avoiding the taxes 
which have been paid for much of the resources (worker education, health care, logistics, 
transport systems) which have allowed them to amass wealth. Many become ‘virtual 
taxpayers’ who, while avoiding tax, ‘send their children to the top publically funded 
European universities’ (Beck, 2000: 6). The lesson we can take from Durkheim is that 
without moral regulation this is the natural result of increased marketisation since ‘the 
doctrine of the most ruthless and swift progress has become an article of faith’ (Durkheim 
1952: 218) and there is no way of ‘preventing the law of the strongest from being applied 
too brutally’ (Durkheim. 1984: xxxix).
To summarise the argument concerning the age of austerity to this point, the state of 
economic anomie creates a situation whereby wealth is seen to be due solely to individual 
effort and success, necessitating the view that poverty is due to a lack of such effort. 
Under such conditions, the economically strong feel justified in exacerbating the unjust 
nature of contemporary contracts. We can see this relationship manifested in two key 
features of the age of austerity: first, in welfare cuts – these are justified by appeals to 
‘strivers versus shirkers’ and ‘fairness’ seen from the eyes of those paying, rather than 
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receiving, welfare – and, second, in tax avoidance. Both of these make rhetorical and 
legislative appeal to the individualised and anomic conception of wealth distribution.
When locating the ideological position behind such a process, we find an uncanny 
overlap between Durkheim’s time and our own; for Durkheim, it was laissez-faire 
economics; in our time, it is this ideology’s descendant: neoliberalism. By assessing 
this, we also begin to encounter Durkheim’s suggestion for how times of crisis are self-
sustaining; in contemporary terms, why do we encounter double-tip, and near-triple-dip, 
recession?
As highlighted above, for Durkheim the expansion of the market aids the sidelining 
of moral considerations in favour of the profit imperative. However, the corrosive 
nature of markets does not stop there since it also inhibits the potential for, and contests 
the validity of, reasserting morality into the economy. This is part of a historical shift 
Durkheim (1952) notes where ‘for a whole century, economic progress has mainly 
consisted in freeing industrial relations from all regulation’ (p. 215). As a result, more 
and more areas of social life have been subjected to economic demands to the point that
The scientific functions alone are in a position to dispute its ground, and even science has 
hardly any prestige in the eyes of the present day, except in so far as it may serve what is 
materially useful, that is to say, serve for the most part the business professions.
(Durkheim, 1992: 11)2
This expansion of the market is united with the idea of individualised success, 
meaning that
Government, instead of regulating economic life, has become its tool and servant. The most 
opposite schools, orthodox economists and extreme socialists, unite to reduce government to 
the role of a more or less passive intermediary among the various social functions. The former 
wish to make it simply the guardian of individual contracts; the latter leave it the task of doing 
the collective bookkeeping … But both refuse it any power to subordinate social organs to itself 
and to make them converge towards one dominant aim. On both sides nations are declared to 
have the single or chief purpose of achieving industrial prosperity; such is the implication of the 
dogma of economic materialism, the basis of both apparently opposed systems. And as these 
theories merely express the state of opinion, industry, instead of being still regarded as a means 
to an end transcending itself, has become the supreme end of individuals and societies alike. 
Thereupon the appetites thus excited have become freed of any limiting authority. By sanctifying 
them, so to speak, this apotheosis of well-being has placed them above all human law. Their 
restraint seems like a sort of sacrilege.
(Durkheim, 1952: 216)
This apotheosis of well-being therefore sees any restraint as sacrilege or ‘hateful in 
itself’ (Durkheim, 1952: 217). Such restraint is seen as akin to punishing the successful 
and hard-working. This ensures that the lack of moral regulation of the economy is 
maintained by a view which sees regulation to limit, rather than expand, the market as 
itself immoral. This is a central part of neoliberal ideology with its claim that ‘human 
well-being can best be advanced by liberating entrepreneurial freedoms and skills 
within an institutional framework characterized by strong private rights, free markets, 
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and free trade’ (Harvey, 2005: 2). To pursue individual needs and desires economically 
is seen as a wider moral good since, as David Cameron (2012) put it, ‘free enterprise 
promotes morality’. This is then reflected in the response of governments to the initial 
crisis whereby, despite the demonstrable failings of the neoliberal system, regulation 
has not been forthcoming. This is because any regulation to limit the market is seen as 
evil, due to its being a curb on the individual economic freedom which makes up the 
apotheosis of well-being. Therefore, for Durkheim, marketisation is self-justifying and 
perpetuating.
As the above comment from Cameron indicates, it could be claimed that Durkheim’s 
link of markets and ‘amorality’ is a bit too simplistic since the neoliberal conceptualisation 
of markets encapsulates a very particular idea of what it is for individuals to be moral. 
This includes the following: the individuals freely selling their labour for the highest 
value as active agents in a fair and just market (Braedley and Luxton, 2010); that 
individuals can only do so when markets operate without regard to external ‘restrictions’ 
(Connell, 2010); and finally that this becomes part of ‘common sense and everyday 
behaviour’ (Hall, 2011: 728). I would suggest this is a flaw of language on Durkheim’s 
part rather than conceptualisation. As the above has indicated, Durkheim does imagine 
markets to contain a certain individualised morality: the apotheosis of well-being. Given 
Durkheim’s wider sociological concern, this is ‘amoral’ in the sense that while it directs 
individual actions, such direction happens without reference to others. Therefore, it is 
possible to assert that the amoral character of economic life is amoral for Durkheim not 
in the sense that it contains no conception of individualised morality but rather in the 
sense that it is not linked to a collective form of morality, determined by justice. This 
then impacts government action; ‘the dogma of economic materialism’ allows only for 
regulation to further the market, but not to create the moral limits Durkheim sees as 
essential. Therefore, adopting a Polanyian perspective, neoliberalism can be regulated 
into being by governments without also being morally regulated.
Therefore, with new moral regulation lacking, the factors which created the initial 
crisis (the amoral action of the markets, the extension of credit beyond ability to pay, the 
construction of new exotic financial mechanisms) once more expand. But the conditions 
are now even worse since the insatiable appetites and individual desires have already 
been emancipated by the initial crisis, the result being that
There is no tendency to resignation in the feverish impatience of men’s lives. When there is no 
other aim but to outstrip constantly the point arrived at, how painful to be thrown back! Now 
this very lack of organisation characterising our economic condition throws the door wide to 
every sort of adventure. Since imagination is hungry for novelty, and ungoverned, it gropes at 
random. Setbacks necessarily increase with risks and thus crises multiple, just when they are 
becoming more destructive.
(Durkheim, 1952: 217)
Therefore, the economic conditions which produced the initial crisis are likely to 
remain and, in some ways, become more acute. We encounter a crisis defined not by one 
event but by their multiplication – by the double-dip and near-triple-dip recessions which 
emerge from the un-reconstituted economies of the initial credit crunch. We can see the 
predilection for ‘adventure’ and ‘risks’ suggested by Durkheim in our current economic 
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situation. They can be found in the ever more esoteric financial instruments, such as 
derivatives (Sassen, 2012: 461–464) and the manipulation of the London Inter-Bank 
Offered Rate (LIBOR) rate at which banks lend to one another. All of these have contrib-
uted towards the self-perpetuation of crisis. At the same time, possible solutions, such as 
the Tobin/‘Robin Hood’ tax or a splitting of retail and financial banking, are (in the 
United Kingdom at least) dismissed unless they come with the approval of those they 
seek to regulate. The apotheosis of well-being, and its unity with the amoral character of 
economic life, is unquestioned. For Durkheim, this is an inevitable result of the initial 
economic anomie casting all regulation as harmful in itself.
As we have seen, given the rejection of regulation in the initial marketisation respon-
sible for the crisis, there appears to be a lack of political will for regulation as a response, 
as I will indicate below. Any crisis marked by marketisation is therefore self-perpetuating. 
However, there is a further political element to the crisis, namely, the way in which 
governments responded to it by implementing an age of austerity. This requires us to turn 
our attention towards the role of the state in a democracy.
For Durkheim, the state is divided between external and internal functions (Durkheim, 
[1958] 1986). The external functions – which form the initial reason for the state’s 
development – concern the state’s role in military operations and trade. As states become 
more established geographically and politically, such roles become less significant and 
the internal functions become dominant. These concern the nature of the state as the 
‘organ of social justice’ (Durkheim, [1958] 1986: 48). The state is charged to ‘keep a 
rein’ on the inequalities and injustices which emerge from forms of economic organisation 
such as ‘castes, classes, corporations, coteries of all kinds, and all economic entities’ 
(Durkheim, [1958] 1986: 49).3 The prime mechanism through which the state achieves 
this is by the codification of ideas of justice, based within civic morals (Durkheim, 
[1958] 1986: 48, 1992).
The most effective means for establishing such a state is a democracy. Durkheim 
(1992) is very specific in his definition of democracy arguing that
The closer communication becomes between the government consciousness and the rest of 
society, and the more this consciousness expands and the more things it takes in, the more 
democratic the character of the society will be. The concept of democracy is best seen in the 
extension of this consciousness to its maximum and it is this process that determines the 
communication.
(p. 84)
Such a process means that ‘the citizens are kept in touch with what the state is doing’ 
and the state is told ‘what is going on in the deep layers of the society’ (Durkheim, 1992: 
85). This is not to suggest that Durkheim (1992) has a rosy view of a flourishing democracy 
in which citizens are fully engaged in politics,4 rather that under normal conditions 
mechanisms exist via which the democratic process can be, at least partially, enacted.
But a time of crisis cannot, as we have already seen, be considered a time of normal 
conditions. Instead, it could be argued that the communicative connection between the 
state and political society has been noticeably damaged and even cut. Rather than the 
actions of governments being ‘checked by everyone’ as democracy requires (Durkheim, 
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1992), governmental action has been increasingly aimed towards, and approved by, 
economic bodies, be they ‘experts’ (financiers, global finance ministers), institutional 
bodies (credit ratings agencies) or ethereal notions (‘the markets’) (p. 82). To elaborate 
on this notion, there are two cases I wish to draw upon: technocratic governments and 
credit rating bodies.
When the economic crisis was reaching its height in Europe, two countries gained 
technocratic governments within 5 days, largely at the urging of transnational bodies 
including dominant European Union players. Greece was led by the technocratic govern-
ment of Lucas Papademos from 11 November 2011 to 16 March 2012 and Italy by the 
government of Mario Monti from 16 November 2011 to 27 April 2013. Both men were 
chosen explicitly for their background as economists.5 Neither was elected to their initial 
post nor was approval sought from the citizenry, despite the fact that part of their 
‘mandate’ was to enact major social and economic changes. These governments, unbe-
holden to the citizenry and instead owing their power to transnational groups, were not 
therefore linked to political society via the communicative mechanisms of democracy 
but rather became physical manifestations of the dominance of the amoral character of 
economic life. Not only had government become the ‘tool and servant of economic life’, 
it had elevated the toolmakers to leaders.
When we see such a loss of the communicative mechanisms of democracy, we enter 
what Durkheim (1992) termed a ‘pseudo-democracy’ (p. 84), one feature of which is 
that ‘political leaders are only delegates and always provisional’ (p. 88). Here, such 
leaders are delegates from the amoral character of economic life. Due to this disconnection 
between political society and state, an inevitable feature of pseudo-democracies is 
large-scale protest since, with the lack of a clear democratic link between people and 
government, ‘resistance is more sharply defined’ (Durkheim, 1992: 84). The well-
attended protests throughout Greece would seem to, at least partly, be linked to this. 
Therefore, technocratic government is an institutionalisation of economic anomie and 
the rejection of regulation.
However, it could be argued that technocratic governments, with their open allegiance 
to, and parenthood from, economic rationality simply, to repeat Durkheim’s (1992)  
critique of classical economics, ‘raise a de facto state of affairs which is unhealthy, to the 
level of a de jure state of affairs’ (p. 10) since the same process has occurred in countries 
without a pseudo-democratic setup. Rather than government actions being determined 
via democratic communication, it could be argued that it has, even more than before the 
crisis, been judged according to the considerations of the amoral character of economic 
life. This is most notable in the United Kingdom where the success or failure of austerity 
measures has not been measured in unemployment or poverty rates but rather by techno-
cratic economic measures including the maintenance, and eventual loss, of a ‘triple A’ 
credit rating, the approval of bodies such as the International Monetary Fund and the 
approval of ‘the market’ (which takes on a quasi-spiritual formation; cf. Taussig, 1997). 
Here, political decisions have their value judged on purely economic grounds, outlined 
by technocratic bodies or ethereal notions, despite the appearance of democracy. This 
means that the expansion of economic rationality continues apace and the moral ends 
towards which economic action should be directed are discarded. As Durkheim (1992) 
put it in words which echo in the current day, ‘there exists to-day a whole range of 
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activity outside the sphere of morals … And it is precisely due to this fact that the crisis has 
arisen from which the European societies are now suffering’ (pp. 10–11). The apotheosis 
of well-being is once more a guiding light and crisis is the result.
In the preceding section of this article, I have argued that Durkheim’s relevance to our 
current economic crisis is not only limited to explaining its initial manifestation via eco-
nomic anomie but also to the economic and political conditions which occur in an age of 
austerity. This has taken three forms. First, the exacerbation of inequality produced by the 
initial condition of economic anomie and made worse by the crisis becomes a notable 
divide of rich and poor where the rich increasingly feel their wealth is solely down to 
individual effort. In such a situation, welfare cuts are justified via a discourse of ‘strivers 
vs shirkers’ where the poor must be forced to generate their own wealth to combat their 
perceived laziness. Second, this belief in wealth being due to individual effort also means 
that new forms of regulation, notably moral regulation, are seen as harmful and to be 
opposed in all cases. This means that regulation to combat the original crisis is not passed 
and the conditions remain for the perpetuation of crisis in the form of double- and near-
triple-dip recessions. Finally, rather than the state and political society being linked by the 
communicative mechanisms of democracy, governmental actions are decided primarily 
with recourse to economic rationality. This has been seen in the ‘pseudo-democracies’ 
of technocratic Greece and Italy and the importance given to transnational economic 
measures, such as credit ratings and the ephemeral decisions of the market.
This brings us to the final point of our discussion: having highlighted Durkheim’s 
explanation for our crisis, is there any solution offered in his work? To quote one of 
Durkheim’s contemporaries, ‘what is to be done?’
Conclusion: Durkheim’s way out of crisis
As we have seen, the current crisis for Durkheim has both economic and political elements. 
However, to understand any potential solution to such a crisis, we must return to the 
realm of morality. Durkheim ([1899] 1986), when confronting the challenges of his time, 
most notably the lack of economic regulation, spoke of a malaise as ‘not rooted in any 
particular class; it is general over the whole of society’ (p. 143). This malaise should for 
Durkheim ([1899] 1986, 1959) be seen as ‘one of refashioning the moral constitution of 
society’ (p. 143) through discovering the ‘moral restraint which can regulate economic 
life’ (p. 240). It is beyond the scope of this article to fully elaborate the various views on 
the nature and positioning of Durkheim’s politics. While I (Dawson, 2013) have argued 
that Durkheim can be located within the history of libertarian socialism, others have seen 
him as advocating a fundamentally corporatist (Black, 1984), communitarian (Cladis, 
1992), republican (Giddens, 1971) or liberal/reformist socialist project (Lukes, 1973). 
What is important for our discussion is that while these views differ, they all highlight the 
centrality of morality, as in Lukes’ (1973) claim of Durkheim being a ‘moralistic’ social 
reformer (p. 546). Indeed, a recent history of political theory, undecided on whether 
Durkheim was a ‘market socialist’ or a ‘communitarian’, nevertheless places him as the 
pinnacle of a French school which sees moral unity as determining the strength of the 
political (Ryan, 2012: 983–984). As we have seen above, it is this lack of moral regulation 
of markets which Durkheim sees at the heart of the malaise.
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This perspective is currently very much missing from political debate. Given the 
dominance of the amoral character of economic life, political actors currently base their 
appeal upon their ability to create economic growth, as we have seen for Durkheim 
‘nations are seen as having the single or chief purpose of achieving industrial prosperity’. 
Even when questions of morality are touched upon, these are discussed in the context of 
economic conditions such as in Ed Miliband’s (2012) claim that a future Labour govern-
ment would ‘deliver fairness even when there’s less money around’. Missing from such 
a debate is Durkheim’s key contribution: that economic growth can only be a means 
towards a morally determined end – when the debate of these moral ends is abdicated, 
then it is only an anomic economy which can emerge; the profit imperative becomes both 
means and end. As I have suggested, this is not to deny that neoliberal markets do not 
contain a type of morality rather that this is neoliberal individualised morality. By accepting 
the needs of the economy as dominant over the rest of social functions, political actors 
forego their responsibility to use the state to ‘work out certain representations which hold 
good for the collectivity’ (Durkheim, 1992: 50). Most importantly, any debate as to the 
wider values for which an economy stands is lost in claims that we can no longer afford 
these morally desirable but expensive policies. However, as Karl Mannheim (1951) later 
put it,
The phrase ‘we cannot afford it’ always implies reference to ‘under the given circumstances’, 
i.e. those of income distribution, taxation, deliberately tolerated scarcity, the production of 
luxury goods, plus an attitude of complacency.
(p. 262)
In this light, any question of economic regulation returns attention to the fact that this 
will inevitably need to be moral regulation. Since, as Steiner (2011) correctly puts it, ‘the 
question of justice is central in Durkheim’s sociological approach to the economy’, such 
moral regulation would be concerned with achieving justice throughout society, rather 
than simply ‘fairness’ for taxpayers (p. 29). A Durkheimian contribution to the debate on 
how to move past the era of crisis, whether we see this as a socialist, liberal or commu-
nitarian intervention, will remember that ‘the social question … is not a question of 
money or force; it is a question of moral agents. What dominates it is not the state of our 
economy but, much more, the state of our morality’ (Durkheim, 1959: 204). This is not 
to claim that this moral question is easily answered; indeed, as we have seen, Durkheim 
argues times of economic anomie are especially resilient to any regulation, be it moral or 
otherwise, which may explain why previous crises have not given birth to Durkheim’s 
hopes. Nevertheless, some (Black, 1984; Muller, 1993) have argued that fundamental 
elements of Durkheim’s project were achieved in the welfare states of the post-war era. 
While this underplays the radicalness of Durkheim’s goals, it does demonstrate some of 
its applicability and links into an essential element of his optimism that such moral regu-
lation was possible.
Such optimism can be seen in the events of 1915 where, with the minds of France 
turning to what their country would look like after the war and whether there should, or 
could, be a return to the era of laissez-faire, Durkheim contributed to a symposium on 
‘The Politics of Tomorrow’ (cf. Fournier, 2013: 707–708). His contribution, appearing in 
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1917, was the last article published in his lifetime. Following his own advice of studying 
the history of political economy to understand the present, Durkheim (2009) argued that
Some great minds realized that economic life could not go to such an extent against the 
fundamental conditions of life in general, that it could not be made up of anarchic, discordant 
movements, from which order and harmony were born miraculously, but that economic life 
pre-supposes an ‘organization’. Such is the principle that Saint-Simon and his disciples helped, 
more than anyone, to bring to light. It is this same idea that is at the basis of all socialist 
doctrines. However diverse the formulas through which they have tried to express themselves, 
all are in agreement on this fundamental truth, that economic activity is something eminently 
social, that it is concerned with social ends, with social interests, and that, accordingly, it needs 
to be ‘socially organized’.
(p. 4)
Durkheim (1992) contrasted such a view with the ‘strangely superficial notion’ held 
by economists that regulation was a ‘rather tyrannous militarisation’, arguing instead that 
given the pre-existing role of governments and social ties (e.g. trust) in the economy, it 
is clear that ‘it should be socialised’ (p. 29). Indeed, it could be argued that Durkheim had 
a ‘evolutionist’ view of economic regulation (Fournier, 2013: 492). The fact that neolib-
eralism seems to strike at the heart of this in its turn to marketisation makes the need for 
raising moral questions even more profound; as Durkheim (1982) put it, sociology 
should have a ‘constant preoccupation’ with ‘practical’ questions such as economic 
organisation (p. 160). It is hard to think of a more fitting coda for the distinctively socio-
logical contribution Durkheim can make to understanding our current crisis.
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Notes
1. Indicated by the perhaps counter-intuitive finding that as the rate of unemployment decreases 
so does the average length of each job. When the labour market expands, individuals are more 
willing to leave one job to seek out another (Doogan, 2009: 171).
2. The overlap between this statement of the 1890s and contemporary concerns of the ‘impact agenda’ 
and the increased privatisation of the university sector in England being especially notable.
3. As argued elsewhere (Dawson, 2013: 72–83), in Durkheim’s ideal society, the practical 
elements of this and the actual governing are not conducted by the state but rather by the 
secondary groups of political society, in Durkheim’s case the corporations (see also Black, 
1984: 220–241).
4. Indeed, Durkheim (1992) highlights the multiple shortcomings with liberal representative 
democracy based on geography (pp. 98–109).
5. Monti had some background in politics having worked as a European commissioner from 
1999 to 2004; Papademos had no such experience.
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